How family law changed as of 1 January 2026

12. 01. 2026

As of 1 January 2026, an extensive amendment entered into force that has significantly transformed the practical functioning of family law, particularly in the areas of divorce, arrangements concerning minor children, maintenance (alimony), and judicial procedures. This is not merely a cosmetic change in terminology; rather, it affects the very logic of proceedings, the expectations placed on parents, and the manner in which courts handle conflicts between parents after separation.

One of the most significant changes is the simplification of the divorce process. The previous practice—where the court would typically first decide separately on the child’s arrangements for the period after divorce and only subsequently rule on the divorce itself—has been replaced by a concept allowing these issues to be addressed within a single set of proceedings. The practical impact is substantial: fewer procedural steps, reduced time and psychological burden for the family, and a greater likelihood of resolving the situation more swiftly. At the same time, there is a stronger emphasis on parental agreement and on establishing a functional arrangement for the child, rather than on the formalistic conduct of multiple consecutive proceedings.

The amendment also changes the approach to divorce itself. In cases of marital breakdown, the emphasis is no longer generally placed on a detailed “uncovering of the spouses’ past,” but rather on whether the marriage is genuinely and irretrievably broken down and whether the statutory conditions for divorce are met. In practice, this means less room for procedural escalation through evidence concerning intimate causes of the relationship’s breakdown where such evidence is not necessary for the decision. In the case of agreed (consensual) divorces, there is an expanded scope for procedurally simpler proceedings, which is particularly significant where spouses are capable of rational communication and seek to conclude the matter with dignity.

A very important change also concerns the approach to child care after parental separation. The new regulation departs from the earlier emphasis on formal categorization into labels such as sole custody, alternating custody, or joint custody, and instead focuses more on a specific determination of each parent’s scope of care in accordance with the child’s best interests. The emphasis thus shifts from formal terminology to the actual functioning of family arrangements. For parents and their legal representatives, this means it is even more important to clearly define the practical regime of care, communication, handovers, and everyday decision-making.

The amendment explicitly strengthens the principle of equal parental care. The new wording of the law clearly establishes that a child has the right to equal care from both parents and that both parents have the right to provide such care. At the same time, it expressly formulates the obligations of parents to properly prepare the child for the other parent’s care, to enable such care, and to cooperate. This change is not only declaratory but also significant for legal argumentation in court practice, as the law now more precisely defines the expected conduct of parents.

This is closely related to a stricter approach to obstructing the other parent’s care. The new regulation explicitly provides that unjustified, persistent, or repeated interference with the other parent’s care constitutes grounds for a new decision on the child’s arrangements. In other words, a parent who long-term fails to respect the established regime and systematically disrupts the child’s relationship with the other parent is now exposed to a more pronounced procedural risk of a change in the court’s decision. This represents an important signal in practice, as obstruction of contact or care has historically been a frequent but difficult-to-remedy issue.

The amendment also addresses the contact of a parent with the child during periods when the child is in the care of the other parent. The law now more precisely regulates the right to indirect contact and the right to information about the child within a reasonable scope. In practice, this provides a clearer legal basis for ordinary remote communication and the sharing of essential information regarding the child’s health, schooling, or extraordinary events. This is particularly important in high-conflict parental relationships, where information blocking is often used as a form of pressure.

The amendment also brings a significant symbolic and practical shift in the area of child upbringing. The law now explicitly requires upbringing without corporal punishment, mental suffering, or other degrading measures, and expressly states that corporal punishment and degrading treatment interfere with the child’s human dignity. This does not represent a “new prohibition of parenting,” but rather a clearer articulation of the value framework that informs the assessment of parental conduct, parental responsibility, and the best interests of the child. In legal practice, this may play a role both in custody disputes and in the evaluation of evidence concerning the child’s upbringing environment.

The amendment further affects the area of maintenance (alimony). The law now refines certain criteria on which courts rely when determining maintenance, including consideration of reasonably foreseeable future changes in the needs of the entitled person. There is also a stronger focus on the actual earning capacity of the obligated parent—not merely on formally declared income, but also on the income the parent could achieve given their health, education, qualifications, and the labor market situation. In practice, this may limit intentional income reduction or defenses based solely on currently low earnings without broader context.

A highly discussed novelty is the possibility of assigning a due monetary maintenance claim, as awarded by a court, for consideration. This change may allow some entitled parents to obtain funds earlier than would be possible through enforcement. However, it also introduces a mechanism that will require increased caution in practice, as the involvement of third parties in maintenance matters raises new legal and ethical questions, particularly regarding the economic benefit of such arrangements for the entitled party.

From 2026, stricter rules also apply to default interest on unpaid maintenance for minor children. For the initial period of default, an increased daily rate applies, after which the interest reverts to the general regime. In practical terms, this results in a significantly higher financial impact of default already at its initial stage and creates stronger incentives for timely fulfillment of maintenance obligations. For obligated parents, this change is substantial, as delaying payments may now become significantly more costly much more quickly than before.

Significant changes have also occurred in the procedural aspects of family (custody) matters. The amendment introduces a special instrument of interim child arrangements, intended as a faster and clearer tool for temporarily organizing the situation where court intervention is necessary but does not require the most severe forms of immediate protection. At the same time, the regulation includes mechanisms designed to prevent repeated manifestly unfounded motions and procedural abuse. This is particularly relevant in high-conflict disputes, where interim motions were sometimes used as a pressure tactic.

The amendment also strengthens the enforceability of court decisions in matters concerning children. In the area of enforcement, court procedures have been streamlined and sanctioning tools have been tightened, including the introduction of minimum thresholds for individual fines in cases of non-compliance. Additionally, the possibilities for responding to obstructed care or contact have been expanded, including substitute implementation to an appropriate extent or reimbursement of reasonably incurred costs. The practical implication is clear: court decisions are intended to carry greater authority, and non-compliance is to have more tangible consequences for the breaching parent.

The changes also affect court fees. A distinction is now made between the fee for filing for a consensual divorce and for other types of divorce, and a fee obligation is introduced for appeals in certain selected matters concerning minor children and in divorce proceedings. This aspect has practical implications for procedural strategy, as the cost dimension of disputes becomes a more significant factor in deciding whether and how to pursue an appeal.

For clients and their legal representatives, the conclusion is straightforward but important: from 2026 onwards, it is even more advantageous to prepare the case thoroughly from the outset. Family law is not moving toward “automatic” solutions, but rather toward an emphasis on functional parental agreements, clearly defined care arrangements, demonstrable communication, and timely fulfillment of obligations. Those who approach the court with a well-considered proposal, substantive arguments, and an effort to establish a practically enforceable arrangement of the child’s circumstances generally have a significantly stronger starting position under the new procedural framework.

At the same time, it remains true that prior decisions concerning child care are not automatically annulled or “rewritten” by the mere entry into force of the amendment. A change in legislation in itself does not mean that parental arrangements are immediately altered; such changes occur only through standard procedures upon fulfillment of statutory conditions, typically in the event of a change in circumstances. This is also important to explain clearly to clients in practice in order to avoid the mistaken expectation that a legislative change automatically opens the way to an immediate review of all previous decisions.

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