Liability for legislative (in)action in the Czech legal environment

22. 01. 2026

Introduction
Just as the principle neminem laedere[1] applies between private-law subjects in horizontal legal relationships, this principle must also be used and applied in situations where the state or another authority, represented by those exercising not only state power but public power as a whole, asserts its monopoly on sovereign interference with the legal sphere of addressees within a subordinated legal relationship. At the same time, however, it is necessary to emphasize the well-known maxim that with great power comes great responsibility, and where any authority interferes with the legal sphere of an addressee contrary to a legal rule, thereby causing that person damage, such damage must be compensated.

Given the dispute as to whether Article 36(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter the “Charter”) constitutes a directly applicable legal norm, it is necessary to examine to what extent Act No. 82/1998 Coll., on liability for damage caused in the exercise of public power by a decision or by maladministration / an incorrect official procedure (hereinafter the “State Liability Act”), is determinative for the issue at hand. This Act is intended to be the legal regulation more specifically governing compensation for damage arising from the exercise of public power, as envisaged by Article 36(4) of the Charter. In its Section 13, this Act refers to maladministration or an incorrect official procedure, and subsequently subsumes under that concept also cases where an act was not performed or a decision was not issued within the statutory time limit, or within a reasonable time limit.

The research question of this article is therefore obvious. Does the Czech legal environment reflect the real threat of pecuniary damage to addressees of legal norms connected with the legislative action or inaction of public authorities, and can such action or inaction possibly be regarded as an official procedure, or an incorrect official procedure?

In the second part of this article, I shall deal in greater depth with the possibilities of explicitly implementing this legal issue into the legal order of the Czech Republic, that is, with de lege ferenda reflections, which will be based on the theoretical framework established in the first part of the article.

It should be added that this article examines legal liability, not political liability or any other form of responsibility that may be associated with legislative action or inaction. Wherever this article refers to “liability,” it refers precisely to this type of liability connected with the obligation to compensate injured parties for the harm caused.

By its content, this article presupposes a continuation in the second part of the article, which will be published in the next issue of Právní rozhledy and will deal in greater depth with the possibilities of implementing this legal issue into the Czech legal order, and thus with de lege ferenda considerations. That second part will build on the general premises of such legislative liability discussed in this first part of the article, which is why knowledge of the first part will be essential for understanding the second.

Both articles are based on conclusions reached by the author in his rigorous thesis entitled Legislative Action or Inaction of State Authorities and Territorial Self-Governing Units as an Incorrect Official Procedure under Act No. 82/1998 Coll., which was defended in 2023.

Liability for legislative action or inaction in the Czech legal environment
Introduction to the issue
The issue of liability for damage caused by legislative action or inaction underwent a turbulent development, especially between the 1960s and the 1990s, primarily within the framework of European Community law. This initiative of the European Union stirred the previously rigid and uncontested legal conclusion that the state is liable only for defective decisions and maladministration, but not for defective legislative action or inaction.

At the same time, however, it must be added that, if one leaves aside state liability for legislative inaction established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter the “CJEU”) in Francovich[2] and the subsequent CJEU decisions building upon that judgment,[3] the domestic legal regulation of individual states has remained reserved in this respect, and none of the EU Member States has reflected this groundbreaking stance of the European Union in any deeper manner in its domestic legal framework. Liability for legislative action or inaction of state authorities is thus rather an exception than a rule, intended for isolated cases, and is moreover often inferred only by the judiciary.[4]

Individual arguments for and against the introduction of legislative liability
In the course of the development of state liability for legislative action or inaction, basic arguments both in favor of and against the introduction of such liability have been formulated. It is useful to know this line of reasoning not only because it is employed by the highest courts of the Czech Republic in the reasoning of their decisions, but above all so that the reader may understand the individual problematic aspects associated with legislative liability.

The basic argument against introducing liability of legislative bodies has become the principle of separation of powers, and the institution of state liability for legislative action or inaction has struggled with this argument since its very inception.[5] It is emphasized that legislative liability, especially that of Parliament, should be based on political rather than legal considerations, and that a democratic legislator should not be subject to control by civil courts competent to decide on possible compensation for harm.[6] According to this argument, members of the legislature should account for their action or inaction politically, rather than the state being liable for them in pecuniary terms.[7]

I do not, however, consider this argument entirely appropriate in light of historical experience. Absolute non-liability of the sovereign for legislative action or inaction often meant a considerable degree of arbitrariness. This was manifested above all in the trampling of fundamental human rights.

It is true that in a democratic state founded on the separation of powers according to the principle of checks and balances, it is inappropriate for the judiciary to restrict the democratic adoption of normative acts by the legislative branch.[8] This cannot, however, be understood in absolute terms, and in cases of manifest excess it is, on the contrary, desirable that action be taken against it. This approach may be justified above all by the protection of human rights and by the legitimate expectations of addressees of legal norms regarding the rationality of adopted legal regulations. Nor may one disregard the hierarchical structure of legal norms and the relationship based on the conformity of norms of lower legal force with those of higher legal force.

I therefore cannot, without reservation, agree with the view expressed in the judgment of the Supreme Court of 31 July 2007, Case No. 25 Cdo 1124/2005, according to which: “The legislature decides by voting of its members on whether to adopt or reject a submitted bill, by voting of its members on whether to adopt or reject a submitted bill, without there being (nor can there be) any rule or regulation as to how a deputy, senator, or parliamentary or senatorial group is to vote on the adoption of a law, or what the specific result of the vote should be, or what the approved law should look like; from the result of the vote on a bill one cannot infer state liability for damage toward individual voters or addressees of the norm.” In that decision, the Supreme Court failed entirely to take into account the possible limitations by which bodies endowed with legislative power are constrained in the exercise of legislative activity, which is a fundamental deficiency. It must not be overlooked that even constitutional norm-making, let alone statutory and subordinate norm-making, is not unlimited. It is therefore untrue that legislative bodies are not legally bound in their legislative action or inaction.

In connection with the legislative action or inaction of the constituent power, one may speak, for example, of the super-legality of the Constitution.[9][10] As a general rule, any matter may be regulated by means of a constitutional act, save for the essential elements of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, into which not even the constituent power itself may interfere. Legislative activity in the form of ordinary statutes is bound by constitutional laws. The Czech legal system presupposes that even fundamental human rights may be restricted by statute. Fundamental rights may be restricted by law only if the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter are met (paragraph 2), if this is done on a non-discriminatory basis (paragraph 3), and if their essence and meaning are preserved (paragraph 4). In addition to the above limitations, restrictions may also be considered on the basis of balancing individual constitutional values and fundamental rights standing in mutual conflict.[11] For such cases, the Constitutional Court has introduced the so-called proportionality test.[12] Statutes must therefore be enacted in conformity with the above requirements and, moreover, in conformity with the constitutional order. Finally, subordinate implementing norm-making must also comply with the foregoing and additionally with the statutes which such subordinate norm-making implements. Nor may international treaties be disregarded, by which the Czech Republic undertakes to adapt its domestic legal order in conformity with the obligations thus assumed.

It is therefore not true that legislative activity within the Czech legal order is not legally regulated.

One may thus agree with the above-mentioned view of the Supreme Court, but only subject to the limitation that legislative action or inaction is constrained by rules relating to the legislative process upon which legislative activity in the Czech Republic is built, as well as subject to conformity with international obligations that legislative bodies are required to reflect in their normative activity. Already at this point I draw attention to the obvious distinction between legislative liability in cases of violation of the above rules of norm-making within which a state authority exercises its legislative action or inaction, and mere “irrationality of the legislator,”[13] which in the overwhelming majority of cases may be described as the exercise of political discretion, as discussed above.

It is therefore not true that a legislative body is bound in its legislative action or inaction only by political responsibility, as is often claimed by opponents of legislative liability.

Another argument against the introduction of legislative liability is based on fear of possible pecuniary consequences for the state. Some authors speak, in connection with the introduction of legislative liability, of opening a “Pandora’s box,”[14] thereby pointing to the financial consequences, which could be substantial and even devastating for the state.

Legislative acts of state authorities and territorial self-governing units are characterized by their general nature. These acts affect an indeterminate range of legal spheres of the addressees of legal norms, who may consequently suffer damage. Given the “unlimited” number of such addressees, the damage may be many times greater than in the case of individual acts, where, due to explicit legal regulation, any liability is not in doubt. Attention is thus drawn to the potential burden on public budgets.

This argument is therefore based primarily on economic grounds. I do not agree with it. In modern states governed by the rule of law, economic reasons cannot be a sufficient argument for limiting the possibility of reparation for damage caused to individuals by public power. It may also be argued that, even in the case of maladministration or defective decisions, damage may arise to a substantial group of persons.[15]

It is also argued that, in the case of legislative liability, the protected interest cannot be clearly identified for the purposes of determining legal protection. I am, however, of the opinion that the relevant interest may consist solely in adherence to the principle neminem laedere, on which continental law is built.[16] Every democratic state governed by the rule of law should ensure that the exercise of its powers does not result in unjustified damage to individuals. If the state enshrines this principle for private-law relations, no legitimate reason can be found why it should not be bound by the same principle itself.

The basic argument in favor of introducing legislative liability is precisely the aforementioned principle neminem laedere, which has already been discussed in connection with the possibility or impossibility of identifying the object of protection of legislative liability, and there is no need to elaborate further on this.

Another argument in favor of legislative liability is the doctrine of the so-called rational legislator, which is used primarily for purposes of interpreting legal norms. Bydlinski[17] aptly points out that legislative activity must be approached as a purposive phenomenon, which does not occur merely arbitrarily and always pursues, to a certain extent, reasonable aims rooted in the idea of law.

It is evident that the rational legislator is an abstract ideal which, inter alia, also serves the real legislator as the goal of legislative intentions. In this connection, Holländer[18] refers to the principle of legal certainty and the legitimate expectations of addressees of legal norms regarding the correctness and rationality of norm-making activity, and their good faith in it.

A related argument in favor of legislative liability is the protection of the right to property. Pecuniary damage typically involves interference with the injured party’s property right, which is protected under Article 11 of the Charter.

This argument also underlies the Plenary Opinion of the Constitutional Court of 28 April 2009, Case No. Pl. ÚS-st. 27/09 (cf. paragraph 13 of the reasoning). In that Opinion, the Constitutional Court held that: “In actions by landlords (owners of flats) seeking damages against the state (based on Act No. 82/1998 Coll.), allegedly arising as a result of the long-term unconstitutional inaction of Parliament consisting in its failure to adopt a special legal regulation defining the cases in which a landlord is entitled unilaterally to increase rent and charges for services associated with the use of a flat and to change other terms of the lease agreement, the ordinary courts are obliged to assess the matter from the perspective of the right to compensation for a forced restriction of property rights under Article 11(4) of the Charter and, in this sense, provide the parties to the proceedings with procedural space to express themselves regarding such change in legal assessment.” The Constitutional Court appears to have arrived at this approach also out of concern over possible compensation that might otherwise have been awarded against the Czech Republic by the European Court of Human Rights, as occurred on a similar factual basis in Hutten-Czapska v. Poland.[19]

Theoretical prerequisites of legislative liability
General remarks
As the analysis so far suggests, liability for legislative action or inaction is, by its nature, a highly specific and, at least in the Czech legal environment, entirely unexplored area. In jurisprudence, several prerequisites have been developed which should be assessed within the framework of liability for legislative action or inaction.

The primary prerequisite is the establishment of the unlawfulness of legislative action or inaction,[20] because decisions on the adoption or non-adoption of legal regulations are often based on political considerations which, by their very nature, cannot be regulated. If a state of undesirable legislative action or inaction occurs, what is thereby primarily established is political responsibility, which may result not only in opposition disapproval and influence on the political preferences of voters, but in extreme cases may even provoke civil intolerance toward state power. If, however, one disregards the extreme consequence associated with such an unlawful state, namely anarchy, the typical (and more realistic) consequence will be the absence of any further tolerance for the resulting state of affairs on the part of the body competent to annul legislative acts, which will then annul the act in question.[21]

Great emphasis will, in assessing the prerequisites of liability, be placed above all on the seriousness or qualified nature of the breach as the main prerequisite for the emergence of liability for legislative action or inaction. The same approach is taken by the case law of the CJEU in connection with legislative liability inferred from failure to implement a directive into the domestic legal order.[22]

Tichý[23] attempts to limit legislative liability by proposing that it be regarded as fault-based, arguing that this conclusion is more in keeping with developments in the field. He constructs this prerequisite purposively in order to confine liability to the most serious cases. He offers, however, no deeper argument in support of the appropriateness of fault-based liability, limiting himself to the need to restrict legislative liability.

I do not agree with this view; in accordance with analogia legis,[24] it would seem more appropriate to consider liability as absolutely objective.[25] Likewise, the decisive criterion for determining legislative liability for the resulting damage should not be the argument of protecting the tortfeasor, especially the protection of that tortfeasor’s property, which Tichý[26] also insinuates. I see no legitimate reason for fault-based liability. For that reason, the issue of fault appears redundant.

In the settled case law of the CJEU, which was reaffirmed and further elaborated, for example, in Case C-445/06 Danske Slagterier v. Germany, the basic prerequisites for the assertion of a claim for damages against a Member State arising from legislative action or inaction consisting in failure to implement a directive into the domestic legal order were laid down. As will be shown below, these prerequisites are formulated in general terms and may therefore appropriately be adopted also as prerequisites for the assertion of damage arising from domestic norm-making.

I shall now attempt to outline the basic prerequisites of liability for legislative activity in general terms, as I construct them for the purposes of legislative liability.

Individual prerequisites
The individual prerequisites, which must be fulfilled cumulatively, are as follows:

• the absence in the legal order of a hypothetical norm granting a right to the injured party;
• the qualified nature of the breach of the duty of legislative action or inaction;
• the occurrence of damage in a causal nexus with the qualified breach.

Absence in the legal order of a hypothetical norm granting a right to the injured party
For this first prerequisite to be fulfilled, it must be concluded that, in the case of inactivity, the legislative body ought to have exercised its legislative power. In the case of “defective” activity, that body, conversely, ought either to have refrained from acting or to have exercised its legislative power differently. In connection with legislative inactivity, a certain impulse addressed to the legislative body is presupposed, to which, had the legislative power been properly exercised, the body ought to have responded by means of legislative activity. In the case of defective activity, a legal state is fictionalized which can rationally be assumed in light of the proper exercise of legislative power.

In the context of implementing secondary EU norm-making, that impulse will typically be a directive,[27] whereas in the case of domestic norm-making it will more likely be an impulse in the form of a material source of law. A hypothetical situation is thus simulated, namely the situation that would have arisen in the legal order had the legislative body properly exercised its power.

To designate norms which would have come into existence in connection with the proper exercise of legislative power, I have devised the term “hypothetical norm,” which I use below. By a hypothetical norm I mean a norm which would have arisen had legislative activity been proper, but which, due to an error on the part of the legislative body, was not incorporated into the legal order. This concept also covers situations where the legislative body seemingly reacts to a given impulse, but does so by means of an inappropriate norm. I regard as inappropriate not only a norm contrary to the rules governing the legislative process discussed above, but also a norm which manifestly runs counter to the purpose it was supposed to fulfill.

That hypothetical norm must grant a certain right to the addressee, of which the person is deprived through legislative action or inaction. The purpose of the norm is to confer a right upon the injured party.[28] Moreover, that right must be enforceable as a claim before a court or another authority of public power.[29] This subjective right embodied in the hypothetical norm is understood quite broadly.[30] It may even be a right the conditions for the exercise of which arise only in the future.

At the same time, in the context of recovering damage within the framework of a hypothetical norm, it will be necessary that the norm grant a right to the specific person asserting the claim for damages (the personal purpose of the hypothetical norm), that the hypothetical norm apply to the situation which occurred or was intended to occur in the future (the material purpose of the hypothetical norm), and that the situation occurred in the manner in which the hypothetical norm should have applied (the causal purpose of the hypothetical norm).

Damage cannot arise from legislative action or inaction in the form of a failure to impose obligations on individuals by means of a hypothetical norm. In such cases, the addressees will benefit from the action or inaction of the legislative body.

There will always, however, be conduct in the form of action or omission which, in its consequences, fails to establish the ideal (hypothetical) legal state.

Qualified nature of the breach of the duty of legislative action or inaction
It has already been indicated above that a breach of duty in connection with legislative action or inaction must be relevant. In private tort law, what is typically required is the breach of a protective norm under Section 2910 of the Civil Code or a contractual norm under Section 2913 of the Civil Code, under which even dispositive provisions of law fall.[31]

In the context of compensation for damage caused by legislative action or inaction, the situation is not so clear-cut, and the qualified nature of the breach must be assessed with regard to all the circumstances of the individual case. It is, however, evident that not every breach of rules governing the legislative process is relevant for a claim to compensation for the resulting damage.

The case law of the CJEU requires that, in implementing a directive, the Member State must have exceeded its power “manifestly and seriously.”[32] In that same case law, the Court further concludes that, although it regards state liability as objective, the degree of fault, in the sense of intentional or negligent breach, must also be taken into account.[33]

Where the hypothetical norm is to implement a legal regulation, whether by subordinate norm-making implementing statute law or where such implementation follows from international obligations by which the Czech Republic has bound itself, it is always necessary to assess the possible discretion allowed by the implementing norm. The harmfulness of legislative action or inaction will be greater in the case of failure to implement a precisely defined legal regulation where there is little or no room for deviation.[34]

The vagueness of the concept of the “qualified nature of the breach” allows the courts discretion to assess each case individually and reliably distinguishes manifestly unfounded cases from those in which legislative bodies clearly abuse their power to the detriment of individuals’ rights.

Closely related to this prerequisite is the imputability of the qualified breach to the state. Deficiencies in legislative action or inaction must arise as a result of the defective exercise of legislative power entrusted by the state to those legislative bodies. Given the objective nature of liability, the circumstances that prevented the proper exercise of that power are irrelevant. This does not, however, prevent those circumstances from being taken into account in assessing the qualified nature of the breach.

I do not, however, regard as a qualified breach one that results from a political decision, provided that no rules governing the legislative process have thereby been violated.

In the case of “defective” constitutional legislative activity, this may consist in an interference with the core of the constitutional order or other restriction of constitutional values and fundamental rights in favor of other constitutional values or fundamental rights, contrary to the proportionality test. In the case of statutes, it will concern statutory regulation contrary to the constitutional order, and in the case of subordinate norm-making, legislative activity contrary to constitutional or statutory law. The same applies where subordinate norm-making has no basis in statutory norm-making. Nor may one disregard conflict between domestic law and the international obligations by which the Czech Republic is bound. In such cases, legislative liability may also be inferred, provided that the other prerequisites are met. This may occur, for example, where a legal regulation is adopted that is contrary to international obligations, typically EU regulations.

In the case of legislative inactivity, the situation is more complicated. As has already been indicated above, it will be necessary to construct rules relating to the legislative process within which it can be assessed whether the legislative body failed to act in situations where it ought to have acted. In particular, one may refer to the hierarchy of legal norms, where norms of higher legal force are often dependent, in their application, on implementing regulations of lower legal force. The constitutional order may be seen as the basic framework which, without statutory regulation, is considerably insufficient. One may refer above all to the fundamental rights in Chapter Four of the Charter, where these fundamental rights explicitly require statutory implementing regulation.[35] The same will apply to subordinate norm-making, which depends upon statutory norm-making. It will always, however, be necessary to infer that the superior legal regulation requires activity by the normative body regulating the subordinate legal framework. A similar approach may also be taken where the duty of legal regulation is not required by superior legal regulation, but it is nevertheless apparent from all material sources of law that legal regulation must be adopted. In this connection, the Constitutional Court speaks of “unconstitutional inactivity.”[36]

A considerably easier situation arises where legislative action or inaction is required by international obligations upon which individuals may rely by virtue of the principle of good faith. Typically, this will involve failure to implement a directive or failure to adapt domestic law to a regulation.

Legislative liability is therefore appropriate above all where the breach of the above legislative rules is manifest. I am, however, of the view that legislative liability is also appropriate where an interference with those legislative rules is found in more debatable situations.[37] As I have stated above, I am of the opinion that, in connection with legislative liability, objective liability should be inferred, since legislative bodies ought to have an administrative apparatus sufficiently capable of exercising their powers, and any errors must be borne by those legislative bodies.

Where all the partial prerequisites are fulfilled, the breach of the rules governing legislative action or inaction is manifest and serious, and the other prerequisites discussed above are also met, one may then speak of a qualified breach.

Occurrence of damage in a causal nexus with the qualified breach
As a general rule, damage is borne by the person in whose sphere it arises, according to the principle casum sentit dominus.[38] In order for damage to be borne by another person, i.e. the tortfeasor, that person must “stand closer to the damage.”[39] Damage may be divided into pecuniary loss, which includes loss of profit, and non-pecuniary harm. This distinction is also reflected in Section 1(3) of the State Liability Act,[40] the possible applicability of which will be discussed below.

The State Liability Act does not further elaborate on the concept of damage, and one may therefore refer to the provisions of the Civil Code, which are subsidiary to that Act.[41]

A causal nexus is present where the action or inaction of the legislative body caused damage in the sphere of the addressees of legal norms. In the area of causation, one may employ the well-established conditio sine qua non formula, which has also been adopted by the CJEU[42] and is typical for damages in the Czech law of torts.[43][44] This formula imagines the state of affairs that would have existed had the harmful conduct not occurred. If that state of affairs would have been the same even without the harmful event, then the conduct of the tortfeasor is not causally linked to the damage caused.

In addition, the imputability of the possible consequence is examined within the framework of causation, serving as a notional filter for situations where the consequence arising from the conduct is unforeseeable.[45] “The occurrence of damage as a consequence of the breach of […] law must be objectively foreseeable or foreseeable from the perspective of a qualified observer.”[46] A qualified observer may be characterized as a personified individual possessing knowledge of all causal laws at the time of the harmful conduct.[47] The need for imputability of the consequence to the tortfeasor’s conduct is also pointed out by the PETL in Article 3:201(a).[48]

Melzer[49] also discusses the causal chain, which may be “broken” by a circumstance not caused by the tortfeasor, with the result that the consequence cannot be imputed to the tortfeasor. The CJEU likewise emphasizes this in its judgment of 15 June 1999 in Case C-140/97 Rechberg, according to which it is necessary to examine whether “the causal link was interrupted by the act or omission of another subject of law or by force majeure.”

Nor may one disregard the assessment of the injured party’s own contribution to the harmful event.[50] The CJEU[51] has emphasized that “the national court must verify whether the injured party showed reasonable diligence in order to avoid the damage or to limit its extent.”

Conclusion
The purpose of this part of the article was above all to provide the reader with a basic overview of legislative liability, of the individual arguments for and against the introduction of this kind of liability, and of the individual theoretical prerequisites of legislative liability.

Already at this point, it may be concluded that the Czech legal environment still does not fully reflect the risk of pecuniary harm caused by the legislative action or inaction of public authorities. Notwithstanding the State Liability Act, the current case law of both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court repeatedly confirms that liability for legislative action or inaction cannot be subsumed under the concept of an incorrect official procedure, which, in light of the absence of any other legal regulation of this area, raises the question whether there is another path by which to recover damage arising in connection with legislative action or inaction of public authorities—a question which this part of the article sought to answer.

In the case of domestic legislation, compensation for damage caused by the action or inaction of public authorities is therefore not legally established, which means that injured parties cannot invoke state liability for harm resulting from the absence of legal regulations or inactivity in their creation, and this is a position to which the case law of both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court adheres strictly.

Nevertheless, a certain shift may be observed in the area of liability for legislative inactivity connected with breaches of obligations arising under European Union law. Here, the Constitutional Court has already recognized state liability for failure to implement secondary European law. Such an approach has not, however, yet been extended to cases concerning purely domestic legal regulations.

From the perspective of legal theory, it is evident that the current framework of the State Liability Act is not sufficiently flexible to encompass legislative liability, nor does it allow legislative action or inaction to be regarded as an incorrect official procedure.

De lege ferenda, unless the approach of the highest courts of the Czech Republic changes, it appears desirable to amend the legal framework so as to include explicit liability for legislative action or inaction, because in the author’s opinion the current legal regulation in this area is unsustainable. The Czech legal order should respond more actively to European trends and create room for the protection of individuals against pecuniary harm caused by the action or inaction of public authorities.

I intend to present these de lege ferenda considerations to the reader in the next part of the article, which will build upon the aspects of legislative liability outlined above. In that part, I shall present the current state of regulation of this legal issue within the Czech legal order and, on the basis of the conclusions of this first part, attempt to outline possible de lege ferenda legal approaches.

This article is written according to the legal framework as of 1 January 2025.

Citace:

^[1] MELZER, Filip, TÉGL, Petr a kol.  Občanský zákoník: velký komentář. Svazek IX, § 2894 – 3081. 1 vydání. Praha: Leges 2018, s. 75.

^[2] Rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 19. listopadu 1991, spojené věci C-6/90, C-9/90, Andrea Francovich a Danila Bonifaci a další proti Italské republice (dále jen „Francovich“).

^[3] Např. Rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 5. března 1996, spojené věci C-46/93 a C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA proti Bundesrepublik Deutschland a The Queen proti Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd a další,Rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 25. května 1978, spojené věci 83 a 94/76, 4, 15 a 40/77, Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH & Co. KG a ostatní proti Komisi Evropského hospodářského společenství, nebo Rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 5. března 1996, spojené věci C-46/93 a C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA proti Bundesrepublik Deutschland a The Queen proti Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd a další.

^[4] Např. Nejvyšší soud Belgie (Court de Cassation/Hof van Cassatie ze dne 10.4.2010 ve věci F.09.0042) se ve svém rozhodnutí z roku 2010, přiklonil ve prospěch odpovědnosti státu z legislativní činnosti v případě nesprávného výkonu legislativní funkce nebo jeho opomenutí.

^[5] TICHÝ, Luboš, HRÁDEK Jiří. Odpovědnost státu za legislativní činnost. Praha: Centrum právní komparatistiky Právnické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v Praze, 2012, s. 26.

^[6] POTACS, Michal. Změna v rakouském právu odpovědnosti státu pod vlivem evropského práva. Jurisprudence. Ročník XX, číslo 5/11, s. 20.

^[7] Toto plyne i ze slibu poslanců a senátoru při ustanovování do funkce, kteří slibují: „Slibuji věrnost České republice. Slibuji, že budu zachovávat její Ústavu a zákony. Slibuji na svou čest, že svůj mandát budu vykonávat v zájmu všeho lidu a podle svého nejlepšího vědomí a svědomí.“ (článek 23 odst. 3 Ústavy)

^[8] KOLBA, Jan, ŠULÁKOVÁ, Martina. Nemajetková újma způsobená protiprávním výkonem veřejné moci. Praha: Leges, 2014, s. 24.

^[9] Článek 9 odst. 2 Ústavy

^[10] V řadě svých rozhodnutí Ústavní soud nastínil i obsah pojmu „podstatné náležitosti demokratického právního státu“ dle ustanovení čl. 9 odst. 2 Ústavy. V nálezu ze dne 29. 5. 1997, sp. zn. III. ÚS 31/97 (N 66/8 SbNU 149) v této souvislosti uvedl: „Pojem demokratický stát dle čl. 9 odst. 2 Úst je interpretován Ústavním soudem, jakož i doktrínou. Ve svém rozhodnutí ve věci vedené pod sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 19/93 Ústavní soud pod zmíněný pojem vztáhl materiální, a nikoli formální chápání právního státu.“ Dále při svém odůvodnění odkázal na doktrinální názor, dle kterého do podstatných náležitostí právního státu dle ustanovení čl. 9 odst. 2 Ústavy patři „především svrchovanost lidu a principy obsažené v čl. 5 a 6 Úst a přirozenoprávní ustanovení Listiny základních práv a svobod, která zakládají ústavní právo na odpor (čl. 23 Listiny.“

^[11] Holländer, Pavel. Hlavní doktríny Ústavního soudu České republiky. In Základní lidská práva a právní stát v judikatuře ústavních soudů, Brno: Masarykova univerzita v Brně, 2000, s. 24.

^[12] Test proporcionality Ústavní soud poprvé blíže rozpracoval ve svém nálezu ze dne 12. 10. 1994, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 4/94, v souvislosti s tzv. utajovanými svědky.

^[13] K tomu viz. rozhodnutí Court de Cassation/Hof van Cassatie ze dne 10.4.2010 ve věci F.09.0042.

^[14] Holländer, Pavel, In: TICHÝ, Luboš, HRÁDEK Jiří Odpovědnost státu za legislativní činnost. Praha: Centrum právní komparatistiky Právnické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v Praze, 2012, s. 66

^[15] Dle ustanovení § 159a odst. 2 zákona č. 99/1963 Sb. platí, že: „Výrok pravomocného rozsudku, kterým bylo rozhodnuto ve věcech uvedených v § 83 odst. 2, je závazný nejen pro účastníky řízení, ale i pro další osoby oprávněné proti žalovanému pro tytéž nároky z téhož jednání nebo stavu. Zvláštní právní předpisy stanoví, v kterých dalších případech a v jakém rozsahu je výrok pravomocného rozsudku závazný pro jiné osoby než účastníky řízení.“

^[16] Viz. názor Evropského soudního dvora o aplikovatelnosti 340 odst. 2 SFEU ve věci Francovich, ve které stanoví, že ustanovení je projevem „obecné zásady platné v právních řádech členských států, že protiprávní jednání nebo opomenutí má za následek povinnost k náhradě způsobené škody.“

^[17] BYDLINSKI, Franz., Grundzüge der juristischen Methodenlehre. 3. vydání. Wien : UTB, 2018, s. 24.

^[18] Holländer, Pavel, Ústavněprávní argumentace, ohlédnutí po deseti letech Ústavního soud. 1. vydání. /Praha: Linde, 2003, s 33.

^[19] V tomto rozhodnutí ze dne 19.6.2006, ve věci Hutten-Czapska v. Polsko velký senát Evropského soud pro lidská práva shledal v rozporu s ustanovením čl. 1 odst. 1 Dodatkového protokolu č. 1 k Úmluvě právní úpravu polského právního řádu, která regulovala výši nájemného. Pronajímatelé byly předmětnou regulací vystaveni tomu, že výše nájmů nedosahovala ani náhradě nákladů, které s předmětem nájmu vznikaly, což je omezení vlastnického práva, které bylo přirovnáno velkým senátem Evropského soudu pro lidská práva přirovnáno k faktickému vyvlastnění. V důsledku toho byla stěžovatelce přiznána v předmětném řízení náhrada škody ve výši 30.000 € a náhrada nákladů řízení 22.500 €.

^[20] TICHÝ, Luboš, HRÁDEK Jiří. Odpovědnost státu za legislativní činnost. Praha: Centrum právní komparatistiky Právnické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v Praze, 2012, s. 30.

^[21] Takto tomu bylo i v zmiňovaném nálezu Ústavního soudu ze dne 28. 4. 2009, sp. zn Pl. ÚS 27/09 nebo nálezu Ústavního soudu ze dne 27. 6. 2001, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 16/99, v rámci kterého došlo k zrušení části V. zákona č. 99/1963 Sb., z důvodu dlouhodobých „ústavněprávních deficitů“.

^[22] TICHÝ, Luboš, HRÁDEK Jiří. Odpovědnost státu za legislativní činnost. Praha: Centrum právní komparatistiky Právnické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v Praze, 2012, s. 30.

^[23] Tamtéž.

^[24] Ustanovení § 2 OdpŠk.

^[25] Srov. Nález Ústavního soudu ze dne 10.1.2006, sp. zn. III. ÚS 124/03.

^[26] Tamtéž.

^[27] Francovich.

^[28] Rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 24. března 2009, ve věci C-445/06, Danske Slagterier proti Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

^[29] Rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 5. března 1996, spojené věci C-46/93 a C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA proti Bundesrepublik Deutschland a The Queen proti Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd a další.

^[30] Danwitz, von Thomas, Zur Grundlegung einer Theorie der subjektiv- öffentlichen Gemeinschaftsrechte, DÖV 1996, s. 481.

^[31] Dle ustanovení § 545 OZ platí, že: „Právní jednání vyvolává právní následky, které jsou v něm vyjádřeny, jakož i právní následky plynoucí ze zákona, dobrých mravů, zvyklostí a zavedené praxe stran.“

^[32] Rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 5. března 1996, spojené věci C-46/93 a C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA proti Bundesrepublik Deutschland a The Queen proti Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd a další.

^[33] Srov. např. GELLEMAN, Martin, In: STREINZ, Rudolf, EU/EGV, Kommentar, 2007, s. 312.

^[34] Rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 23. května 1996, ve věci C-5/94, The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte: Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd.

^[35] Ustanovení čl. 41 Listiny.

^[36] Nálezu Ústavního soudu ze dne 28. února 2006 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 20/05.

^[37] Typicky se bude jednat o situace zrušení zákona Ústavním soudem pro rozpor s ústavním pořádkem.

^[38] MELZER, Filip, TÉGL, Petr a kol.  Občanský zákoník: velký komentář. Svazek IX, § 2894 – 3081. 1 vydání. Praha: Leges 2018, s. 6.

^[39] KOZIOL, Helmut, Österreichisches Haftpflichtrecht I², 3. überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage, Jan Sramek Verlag KG, 2018, s.  53.

^[40] „Stát a územní celky v samostatné působnosti hradí za podmínek stanovených tímto zákonem též vzniklou nemajetkovou újmu.“

^[41] Dle ustanovení § 26 zákona č. 92/1998 Sb. platí, že: „Pokud není stanoveno jinak, řídí se právní vztahy upravené v tomto zákoně občanským zákoníkem.“

^[42] Rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 28. října 2004, ve věci C-164/01 van den Bergh v. Rada a Komise.

^[43] MELZER, Filip, TÉGL, Petr a kol.  Občanský zákoník: velký komentář. Svazek IX, § 2894 – 3081. 1 vydání. Praha: Leges 2018, s. 175.

^[44] BEZOUŠKA, Petr. § 2910 [Porušení zákona]. In: HULMÁK, Milan a kol. Občanský zákoník VI. Závazkové právo. Zvláštní část (§ 2055–3014). 1. vydání. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2014, s. 1551, marg. č. 79.

^[45] MELZER, Filip, TÉGL, Petr a kol.  Občanský zákoník: velký komentář. Svazek IX, § 2894 – 3081. 1 vydání. Praha: Leges 2018, s. 176.

^[46] TICHÝ, Luboš. Odpovědnost členského státu za delikt v „systému“ evropského práva. Jurisprudence. Ročník XX, číslo 5/11, s. 7.

^[47] MELZER, Filip, TÉGL, Petr a kol.  Občanský zákoník: velký komentář. Svazek IX, § 2894 – 3081. 1 vydání. Praha: Leges 2018, s. 284.

^[48] „Existuje-li příčinná souvislost podle Oddílu 1 této Hlavy, zda a v jakém rozsahu má být škoda připsána záleží na faktorech jako jsou: a) předvídatelnost škody v okamžiku jejího vzniku rozumnou osobou, přičemž je zohledněn konkrétní časový a prostorový vztah mezi škodným jednáním a jeho následky, nebo rozsah škody ve vztahu k normálním následkům takového jednání.“

^[49] MELZER, Filip, TÉGL, Petr a kol.  Občanský zákoník: velký komentář. Svazek IX, § 2894 – 3081. 1 vydání. Praha: Leges 2018, s. 177.

^[50] ŠTVÁNEK, František, SIMON, Pavel a kol. Zákon o odpovědnosti za škodu způsobenou při výkonu veřejné moci rozhodnutím nebo nesprávným úředním postupem: komentář. 2. vydání. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2020, s. 8.

^[51] Rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 5. března 1996, ve spojených věcech C-46/93 a C-48/93, Brasserie Factortame.

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