Legislative action or inaction of Parliament as maladministration under Act No. 82/1998 Coll.

24. 03. 2026

Introduction
I already drew attention to the basic premises of the issue of the liability of public authorities for harm caused by legislative action or inaction in the first part of this series of articles,[1] in which I defined the very nature of legislative liability, its place within the system of state liability, and, at the same time, the absence of its explicit normative anchoring in the Czech legal order.

In the second part, I followed up on these conclusions with de lege ferenda considerations, both in relation to possible models of future legal regulation and in relation to inspiration drawn from foreign legal systems, in particular the German, Austrian, and French ones.[2]

This third part follows on from the previous two and addresses the issue on the level of positive law. Its aim is to subject to critical analysis the case law of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court on which the currently prevailing conclusion is based, namely that legislative action or inaction of public authorities generally cannot be subsumed under the concept of maladministration, i.e. an incorrect official procedure, within the meaning of Section 13 of Act No. 82/1998 Coll., on Liability for Damage Caused in the Exercise of Public Power. Particular attention will be devoted to the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 22 September 1998, Case No. I. ÚS 245/98, and to the plenary opinion of the Constitutional Court of 28 April 2009, Case No. Pl. ÚS-st. 27/09, which represent the key judicial landmarks for the current understanding of this issue.

This article seeks to verify whether the arguments by which the highest courts justify the impossibility of establishing liability for legislative action or inaction can truly withstand scrutiny from the perspective of the constitutional order, the structure of the State Liability Act, and the more general principles of separation of powers and the rule of law. In this connection, I will examine whether the restrictive conception of maladministration as activity associated solely with the application of law is convincing, and whether the a priori exclusion of norm-making activity—both at the statutory and constitutional level—from the framework of the state’s legal liability is justified.

The purpose of this third part is therefore no longer to reopen the question of theoretical definition or the question of possible future legislative solutions, to which the previous parts were devoted, but rather to deepen the dogmatic and judicial foundations of the entire issue de lege lata, and this in relation to the legislative branch (and, indeed, the constituent power), which is exercised by the Parliament of the Czech Republic. The focus of the analysis will therefore be a critical examination of the internal consistency of the existing case law, of its argumentative premises, and of its limits, precisely in relation to the question whether legislative action or inaction can continue, in the Czech legal environment, to be excluded without further analysis from the framework of liability for the exercise of public power.

The issue in relation to the legislative activity of the executive branch will be addressed in the final part of this series of articles, which I also intend to publish.

Legislative action or inaction of Parliament
General remarks
It has now been more than twenty years since the Constitutional Court delivered its judgment of 22 September 1998, Case No. I. ÚS 245/98, from which one may notionally date the emergence of the issue of liability arising from the action or inaction of legislative bodies within the domestic legal environment. This important milestone was the first to reveal the Constitutional Court’s approach to the issue of liability for damage arising in causal connection with the action or inaction of legislative bodies, above all Parliament, within which context this question is most frequently discussed.

In the case at hand, the complainant sought compensation for damage caused by the defective promulgation of Act No. 267/1992 Coll., amending and supplementing Act No. 87/1991 Coll., on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation, in the Collection of Laws, by which rights to compensation for participants in military forced labour camps were to have been established. In the course of publication, two paragraphs of the provision governing the right to compensation for participants in such camps, which would have conferred on the complainant a claim to compensation had the full text of the enacted statute been published in the Collection of Laws, were omitted by mistake.

Act No. 107/1995 Coll. subsequently inserted the missing paragraphs into the originally published text of the Act. Although the purpose of correcting the defective promulgation of the Act published in the Collection of Laws is clear from Act No. 107/1995 Coll., the mechanism of retroactive effect for the period between the effectiveness of Act No. 267/1992 Coll. and the effectiveness of the “corrective” amendment was absent. For this reason, the legal consequences arose ex nunc rather than ex tunc, i.e. retroactively, as might have been expected in light of the purpose and intent of Act No. 107/1995 Coll. As a result, the complainant could not assert his claim within the relevant period.

According to the Constitutional Court, maladministration in that case consisted in the conduct of staff members of the former Federal Assembly who submitted for promulgation a version of the Act different from the one unanimously approved by the then Members of Parliament. In that case, the Chamber of the Constitutional Court, inter alia, concluded that: “The provision in question (author’s note: Section 18(1) of Act No. 59/1969 Coll.)[3] expressly limits the application of that Act only to maladministration of certain state authorities, among which the legislature cannot be included, whereas Article 36(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, effective since 8 February 1991, has a general nature; it is conceived as a fundamental right of everyone to seek compensation for damage caused to him not only by a court, but by any public administration authority or any other state authority, whether by its decision or by maladministration. That article therefore does not exclude liability for damage arising from maladministration in the promulgation of a statute. […] By the nature of the matter, the Constitutional Court inferred that the error did not occur directly through the legislative activity of the Federal Assembly, but above all through a mistake of the auxiliary administrative apparatus of the Federal Assembly, which submitted to the constitutional office holders for signature an incomplete text of the approved statute.”[4]

In particular, the wording of the last sentence of the above-cited legal opinion of the Constitutional Court was understood a contrario to mean that, had the error occurred “directly through the legislative activity of the Federal Assembly,” whether in the enactment of statutes or constitutional acts, one could no longer speak of maladministration.

Although the Ministry of Justice, in its submission, attempted to persuade the Constitutional Court that Parliament was excluded from the scope of Act No. 59/1969 Coll., the Constitutional Court did not adopt that view.[5] Nor did it accept the systematic interpretation of the Charter advanced by the Ministry of Justice, according to which the concept of official procedure covers only the activity of those state authorities referred to in Chapter Five of the Charter, which also contains the provision on compensation for damage caused by maladministration in terms of systematic classification. Chapter Five concerns the activity of public authorities, which, according to the Ministry of Justice, is connected with the “implementation of law,” that is, the organs of the executive and judicial powers.

The Constitutional Court therefore did not a priori exclude Parliament from the scope of Act No. 59/1969 Coll.; on the other hand, it pointed to the specific nature of legislative activity, on account of which such activity cannot be regarded as an official procedure.

Those conclusions of the Constitutional Court were then used as building blocks for the subsequent case law of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, and they are referred to—indeed quite automatically—even today. Yet this is done without more erudite legal reasoning.

A certain success, however, may be seen in the Constitutional Court’s effort gradually to justify and legitimize in its later decisions the conclusions set out above, on which the highest courts rely, whereas in the above-mentioned judgment of 22 September 1998, Case No. I. ÚS 245/98, the Constitutional Court contented itself merely with the assertion that the concept of maladministration is inapplicable to legislative bodies when exercising “direct legislative activity.”

On the other hand, it would be fair to say that the prevailing doctrinal view, not only among Czech authors, agrees with the Constitutional Court in that state liability cannot be inferred in the case of legislative action or inaction as such.[6] Discussion as to the applicability of the concept of maladministration under Section 13 of the State Liability Act therefore appears superfluous. But is that really so?

Critical analysis of the plenary opinion of 28 April 2009, Case No. Pl. ÚS-st. 27/09, in relation to constitutional and statutory norm-making

For the purpose of answering the question whether maladministration under Section 13 of the State Liability Act can also be applied to situations of legislative action or inaction, it is first necessary to resolve the question of the existence of legislative liability of Parliament for legislative action or inaction. In this respect, it is most appropriate to deal further with the case law of the highest courts, which, given the absence of specialist literature in this area, constitutes the basic source available for analysis.

In this regard, the plenary opinion of the Constitutional Court of 28 April 2009, Case No. Pl. ÚS-st. 27/09 (hereinafter also the “Opinion”), is of central importance. In that opinion, the individual arguments were formulated which explain in greater detail the impossibility of regarding legislative action or inaction as maladministration and, more generally, the impossibility of establishing liability for legislative action or inaction. These arguments are then used by the courts both in relation to statutory and subordinate norm-making, although this is not entirely appropriate.[7]

In the case in question, Parliament was alleged, through legislative inaction which had already been described by the Constitutional Court in an earlier judgment[8] as unconstitutional, to have caused damage by failing to adopt legal regulation of unilateral rent increases as envisaged in Section 696(1) of Act No. 40/1964 Coll., the Civil Code, thereby making it impossible for landlords to increase rent even where the rent received did not cover even the costs associated with the maintenance of the property. In that Opinion, compensation was granted which the Constitutional Court—apparently out of fear of possible precedential consequences—did not describe as damages, but rather as compensation for the unconstitutional restriction of property rights.[9] I leave it to each reader to consider whether he or she sees any difference between compensation for “damage caused by legislative action or inaction” and compensation for an “unconstitutional restriction of the right under Article 11(4) of the Charter,” on the basis of which the “compensation for unconstitutional restriction of property rights” was granted in the Opinion. I am of the view that damages in the Czech legal order have their constitutional basis precisely in the aforementioned Article 11 of the Charter, and that all further statutory regulation of damages merely implements that constitutional right. Where Parliament, through its legislative action or inaction, violates rules relating to the legislative process and damage arises as a consequence, it may then be inferred that Article 11 of the Charter has always been interfered with.

The Constitutional Court used the constitutional complaint also as an opportunity to express three basic arguments supporting the view it had already previously expressed, namely that liability cannot be inferred from legislative action or inaction, and that therefore legislative action or inaction cannot be subsumed under official procedure within the meaning of Section 13 of the State Liability Act.

I shall now attempt to present these individual arguments to the reader and address them in such a way that the shortcomings they entail become apparent.

The arguments on the basis of which the Constitutional Court in its Opinion inferred the impossibility of establishing liability of legislative bodies are: (1) deriving political responsibility from the activity of legislative bodies, (2) the prohibition of limiting the autonomy of those legislative bodies, and (3) the liability of public authorities only for the application of law.

The first argument is based on deriving political responsibility of members of the legislative body, and on the associated exclusion of legal liability. I have already addressed this argument sufficiently in the first article,[10] and I shall now attempt to focus on certain specifics arising within the Czech legal order and to build on the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in the Opinion.

The Constitutional Court inferred that: “Parliament cannot be regarded as a public administration authority, a court, or another comparable state body. This is particularly so where Parliament exercises its legislative power. Responsibility for the exercise of that power is, in the first place, political.”[11] The central idea of this argument is based on the fact that deputies and senators exercise their mandate personally in accordance with their oath and are not bound by any instructions in doing so (Article 26 of the Constitution). In this part, I merely refer to the discussion of the rules relating to the legislative process contained in the first article of this series.[12]

The Constitutional Court’s position, which links political responsibility only to Article 36(3) of the Charter, is certainly worthy of reflection. When applying Article 11(4) of the Charter, on which the above-mentioned plenary opinion is built, the Court no longer takes this argument into account at all, although the same state body is in question.

I must admit that I cannot find the Constitutional Court’s motive for distinguishing in this way between situations that are in fact comparable but are assessed on the basis of different provisions of a legal regulation. Both situations may be described as a fault of the legislative body. If, therefore, Parliament is to be characterized as a body founded on a political basis, then this must apply to all of its legislative action or inaction, regardless of the norms that Parliament violates through that action or inaction. Yet the Constitutional Court entirely omits this from its argumentation. At the same time, it does not indicate any reason for the differing approach in the individual cases.

It may therefore be concluded that, according to the Constitutional Court, the sphere of political responsibility functions as a kind of switch diverting the case away from legislative liability. The Constitutional Court is not, however, the only one to rely on political responsibility; it is already clear from the first article[13] that this form of argument is well known in many continental legal systems. It would nevertheless have been appropriate for the Constitutional Court to elaborate on this argument more fully.

The mere fact that Parliament derives its legitimacy from democratic elections cannot be a reason why it should not perform its activity properly. I therefore cannot be satisfied with this conclusion of the Constitutional Court alone. On the other hand, it is evident that legislative power is by its nature a specific area. Yet this cannot by itself lead to a refusal of liability for this sphere of public power. I emphasize that the specific nature of legislative power is certainly a reason for a very cautious approach to individual failings, and accordingly for a restrained attitude toward less serious failings and a limitation of liability to the most serious cases within the framework of the qualified nature of the breach, as discussed in the first article.[14] However, on these grounds one cannot a priori remove liability for legislative action or inaction from Parliament. Doing so would create an unjustified inequality between public authorities exercising legislative power and all other public authorities, which are in principle liable for the exercise of the powers entrusted to them. This applies all the more because defective conduct of the legislative body in the course of legislative action or inaction may have fatal consequences for a relatively unlimited number of addressees of the legal norms in question. Indeed, the Constitutional Court itself reached that conclusion in the aforementioned judgment of 22 September 1998, Case No. I. ÚS 245/98, when it based its reasoning on the fact that: “In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the opposite interpretation would lead to a disturbance of the balance between the legislative, executive, and judicial powers,” a proposition against which nothing can be said and with which I fully agree.

It is therefore clearly impossible simply to conclude that legislative bodies are not liable for their action or inaction and to refer injured parties to political responsibility, which obviously does not compensate them for the damage suffered.

The second argument on which the Constitutional Court’s negative view in the Opinion is based—both as regards inferring legislative liability of Parliament and as regards treating legislative action or inaction as maladministration under Section 13 of the State Liability Act—is founded on fear of limiting the autonomy of the norm-maker. The Constitutional Court infers that establishing liability for legislative action or inaction would entail an impermissible restriction of the “maneuvering space of the legislator.”[15]

One may fully agree with the proposition that liability for legislative action or inaction will typically entail consequences in the form of influencing such legislative action or inaction, which is necessarily unavoidable. Even apart from legislative liability and the consequent duty to compensate damage, the very system of checks and balances, to which the Constitutional Court itself refers in the Opinion, presupposes the possibility of interfering with the activity of the legislative branch by annulling legal regulations where they are in conflict with constitutional provisions.[16]

The paradox is that the Constitutional Court is fully aware of this, when it points out that: “The limits of the legislator’s freedom of discretion are indeed set by the constitutional order, but the consequence of exceeding them is the possibility of annulment of the statute or a declaration of its unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Court,” thereby acknowledging the existence of rules regulating legislative action or inaction and, by the same token, affecting it.

The Constitutional Court further adds in the Opinion that even the annulment of a statute for inconsistency with the aforementioned rules does not establish a right of individuals to damages. Specifically, it states that: “Although such intervention by the Constitutional Court may, under certain circumstances, affect the rights of an individual into which such statute or gap in the statute has interfered (for example, by rendering the statute inapplicable in a particular case), it does not establish for the individual a claim to damages.”

The Constitutional Court once again fails to state why liability for legislative action or inaction and an award of damages by the ordinary courts cannot be established in such cases. Conflict of a statute with the constitutional order is a typical example of what I referred to when constructing the rules relating to the legislative process, on the basis of which I inferred legislative liability. With reference to the analysis already provided, I therefore cannot agree with that view.

Where the Constitutional Court is competent to decide on the conformity of a statute with the constitutional order and, for that reason, to declare a statute unconstitutional, the question arises why those conclusions could not also be used for the benefit of individuals who then turn to the ordinary courts with claims for compensation for damage caused in connection with an unconstitutional statute.

Moreover, the annulment of a statute on the ground of inconsistency with constitutional provisions is a much more intensive interference by the judicial power with the activity of the legislative power than subsequent compensation for damage caused by defective legislative action or inaction, which has only a reparatory purpose. Nor do I make these conclusions only in connection with the annulment of a statute for inconsistency with the constitutional order. I am of the opinion that breach of the rules relating to the legislative process constitutes an objective state of affairs that can be assessed even where the statute itself need not be interfered with by the Constitutional Court at all. However, given the fact that in the Czech Republic the assessment of the constitutionality of statutes belongs to the Constitutional Court, any claim for damages would presumably have to be preceded by that Court’s legal opinion on the unconstitutionality of the statute.

Such damages would not be paid from the budgetary chapter of Parliament, which would much more directly affect the activity of that legislative body. It is therefore questionable to what extent the award of damages caused by legislative action or inaction is actually capable of interfering with the autonomy of the will of the legislative body.

The conclusions of the Supreme Court’s judgment of 31 January 2007, Case No. 25 Cdo 1124/2005, which point to the impossibility of regulating legislative action or inaction by rules relating to the legislative process, were already refuted in the first article,[17] and it may therefore only be repeated that it is not true that: “There does not exist, and cannot exist, any rule or regulation determining how a deputy, senator, or parliamentary or senatorial caucus is to vote on the adoption of laws.” It may therefore be concluded that there may be more violations of rules in the context of legislative action or inaction than the highest courts are willing to admit.

It is only the third argument in the Constitutional Court’s Opinion that addresses the very nature of the concept of maladministration. The Constitutional Court infers that maladministration may mean only the exercise of public power by the individual public authorities in the “application of law.” It follows this up with the assertion that: “The liability of the state, or of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as a public authority, for the very exercise of legislative power, the result of which is not the application, i.e. an act of application, of law but rather a statute, is not expressly regulated in the constitutional system of the Czech Republic, whether at the constitutional or statutory level.” According to the Constitutional Court, the exercise of public power by individual public authorities in the creation of law is therefore excluded from the concept of official procedure.

A similar view was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in its judgment of 26 September 2007, Case No. 25 Cdo 2064/2005, in which it held that, in the case of legislative activity, “these are not individually legal acts resulting from decision-making activity in specific cases,” and for that reason rejected legislative liability.

Berka[18] draws attention to a similar approach within the Austrian legal order, stating that: “Liability exists (author’s note: only) for conduct of an authority in implementing statutes,” and that, for this reason, “liability for legislative acts is excluded.” Likewise, Kerner[19] does not regard “legislation as the implementation of statutes.”

It is certainly useful for the application of Section 13 of the State Liability Act that the Constitutional Court offers some interpretation of the concept of maladministration. Yet this interpretation is then restrictively confined to (individual) acts of application of law.[20] At that point, however, the highest courts stop and do not further justify their restrictive approach toward legislative acts.[21]

I shall now attempt to summarize the above Opinion and discuss it as a whole. Viewed critically, the argumentation offered in the Opinion is, overall, unconvincing. I would also point to the contradiction in view between paragraphs 13 and 18 of the Opinion. According to the first of those passages, the Constitutional Court infers that long-term unconstitutional inaction of the legislator does not establish liability of the legislative body under Article 36(3) of the Charter. In paragraph 18 of the Opinion, however, it contradicts that view by stating that legislative liability in such cases is indeed established under Article 36(3) of the Charter, but only in cases involving interference with the fundamental right under Article 11(4) of the Charter. This makes the reasoning of the Opinion even less convincing. As to what the situation would be if other fundamental rights[22] were infringed by long-term unconstitutional inaction, the Opinion tells us nothing. By analogy, however, one may presumably infer the same conclusion and proceed similarly, for example, in cases of interference with the fundamental rights to life and health, human dignity, freedom of expression, and the like.

Höllander,[23] although agreeing with the criticism leveled by the Constitutional Court in the Opinion against Parliament for failing to respect the legal view previously expressed by the Constitutional Court, and with the connected long-lasting unconstitutional legislative inaction, considers the means chosen by the Constitutional Court—namely inferring damages directly from Article 11(4) of the Charter rather than from Article 36(3) of the Charter—to be inconsistent both with the constitutional order and with Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court. In his view, liability for legislative inaction cannot be inferred solely from Article 11(4) of the Charter. He believes that: “The introduction of legal liability to compensate damage (harm) caused as a consequence of legislative inactivity whose unconstitutionality has been declared in a decision of the Constitutional Court constitutes a step of constitutional significance. It constitutes a step that alters the proportion between the categories of democracy and the rule of law, the sovereignty of Parliament and the separation of powers.”

The subsequent case law of the Constitutional Court confirmed that the view expressed in paragraph 18 of the Opinion was not regarded by that Court merely as a theoretical concept, as the Court, relying on Article 11(1) of the Charter, decided accordingly also in its judgment of 6 September 2011, Case No. IV. ÚS 423/08.

Conclusion

One may therefore agree with Smutná and Svoboda,[24] when they state that the current case law of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, in the question of legislative liability within the Czech legal order and in the related legal (research) question of the applicability of legislative action or inaction to maladministration under Section 13 of the State Liability Act, is very brief.

It must be regarded as disappointing that the highest courts, when dealing with such a significant issue in an area where explicit statutory regulation is absent, content themselves merely with the statement that legislative action or inaction cannot be regarded as maladministration, usually only with reference to the assertion that legislative liability cannot be inferred for the Czech legal order, and that the question is therefore redundant. The highest courts arrive at this conclusion, however, without conducting deeper legal analysis, while, as I have shown above, the arguments of the Constitutional Court in its Opinion are unconvincing.

To confirm these conclusions, I also cite the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s judgment of 26 September 2007, Case No. 25 Cdo 2064/2005, which was delivered before the Constitutional Court’s Opinion and in which the Supreme Court encapsulated its reasoning on the issue in a single sentence, stating only that: “The issuance of a normative legal act is not an official procedure of the government, but rather the result of its norm-making activity.”

It may therefore be concluded that the current “judicial mood” of the highest courts does not regard legislative action or inaction of Parliament as maladministration within the meaning of Section 13 of the State Liability Act. For these courts, it is not so much the question of applying the concept in question to legislative action or inaction of Parliament that is decisive, but rather the question of legislative liability as such. Yet, above all in light of the argumentation in the Opinion, it may be inferred that the Constitutional Court does not regard legislative action or inaction as acts of application of law, and for that reason it may be concluded that, even if legislative liability were eventually inferred in the Czech legal order, the Constitutional Court would adhere to its view and hold that legislative action or inaction does not constitute maladministration under Section 13 of the State Liability Act.

One may, however, certainly imagine that these conclusions will eventually be overcome and that a more extensive interpretation of the concept of maladministration will be adopted, together with the consequent inference of legislative liability for legislative action or inaction not only of Parliament.

Citace:

[1] Šafář, J. Odpovědnost za legislativní (ne)činnost v českém právním prostředí. Právní rozhledy, 2025, č. 4, s. 116 a násl.

[2] Šafář, J. Odpovědnost za legislativní (ne) činnost v českém právním prostředí – úvahy de lega ferenda. Právní -rozhledy, 2025, č. 7-8, s. 234 a násl.

[3] Nyní ustanovení § 13 OdpŠk.

[4] Nález Ústavní soud ze dne 22. 9. 1999, sp. zn. I. ÚS 245/98.

[5] Stejný závěr se, s odkazem na tento nález Ústavního soudu, v současnosti dovozuje i pro OdpŠk.

[6] LEWINSKI, von Kai. Öffentliche Insolvenz und Staatsbankrott, Tübingen 2011, s. 236.

[7] K tomuto viz. Šafář, J. Odpovědnost za legislativní (ne)činnost v českém právním prostředí. Právní rozhledy, 2025, č. 4, s. 116 a násl.

[8] Nálezu Ústavního soudu ze dne 28. února 2006 sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 20/05, ve kterém je stanoveno, že: „samotná dikce § 696 odst. 1 obč. zákoníku, která pouze předjímá přijetí nové úpravy, není protiústavní, protiústavní je dlouhodobá nečinnost zákonodárce, jež má za následek ústavně neakceptovatelnou nerovnost a v konečném důsledku porušení ústavních principů“.

[9] SVOBODA, Tomáš. K povaze „krizových opatření“, odpovědnosti za škodu a ochraně subjektivních práv (2. část). Právní rozhledy, 2021, č. 10, s. 348-357.

[10] Šafář, J. Odpovědnost za legislativní (ne)činnost v českém právním prostředí. Právní rozhledy, 2025, č. 4, s. 116 a násl.

[11] Na tomto argumentu je i do značné míry založen zamítavý rozsudek Nejvyššího soudu ze dne 31. 1. 2007, sp.  zn. 25 Cdo 1124/2005.

[12] Šafář, J. Odpovědnost za legislativní (ne)činnost v českém právním prostředí. Právní rozhledy, 2025, č. 4, s. 116 a násl.

[13] Tamtéž.

[14] Šafář, J. Odpovědnost za legislativní (ne)činnost v českém právním prostředí. Právní rozhledy, 2025, č. 4, s. 116 a násl.

[15] Srov. např. KRAMER, Ernst. In: TICHÝ, Luboš. TICHÝ, Luboš, HRÁDEK Jiří. Odpovědnost státu za legislativní činnost. Praha: Centrum právní komparatistiky Právnické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v Praze, 2012, s. 171.

[16] Dle ustanovení čl. 87 odst. 1 písm. a) Ústavy Ústavní soud rozhoduje o zrušení zákonů nebo jejich jednotlivých ustanovení, jsou-li v rozporu s ústavním pořádkem.

[17] Šafář, J. Odpovědnost za legislativní (ne)činnost v českém právním prostředí. Právní rozhledy, 2025, č. 4, s. 116 a násl.

[18] BERKA, Walter. Lehbruch Varfassungsrecht. Wien 2006, s. 223.

[19] KERNER, Ernst, In: TICHÝ, Luboš, HRÁDEK Jiří. Odpovědnost státu za legislativní činnost. Praha: Centrum právní komparatistiky Právnické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v Praze, 2012, s. 172.

[20] PRŮCHA, Petr. Správní právo: obecná část. 8. dopl. a aktualiz. vydání. Brno: Doplněk, 2012, s. 278.

[21] Dále pak také např. rozsudek Nejvyššího soudu ze dne 27. 5. 2015, sp. zn. 30 Cdo 2547/2013.

[22] Ustanovení čl. 11 Listiny zakotvuje právo vlastnit majetek.

[23] HÖLLANDER, Pavel, In: TICHÝ, Luboš, HRÁDEK Jiří. Odpovědnost státu za legislativní činnost. Praha: Centrum právní komparatistiky Právnické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v Praze, 2012, s. 66.

[24] SVOBODA, Tomáš, SMUTNÁ, Veronika. K odpovědnosti za újmu způsobenou podzákonnou normotvorbou. PRÁVNÍK 10/2016, s. 915.

All articles